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Abstract
This paper describes two algorithms for state reconstruction from sensor measurements that are
corrupted with sparse, but otherwise arbitrary, “noise”. These results are motivated by the need to secure
cyber-physical systems against a malicious adversary that can arbitrarily corrupt sensor measurements.
The first algorithm reconstructs the state from a batch of sensor measurements while the second algorithm
is able to incorporate new measurements as they become available, in the spirit of a Luenberger observer.
A distinguishing point of these algorithms is the use of event-triggered techniques to improve the
computational performance of the proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) has recently become a topic of scientific
inquiry in no small part due to the discovery of the Stuxnet malware, the most famous example
of an attack on process control systems [1]. Although one might be tempted to associate CPS
security with large-scale and critical infrastructure, such as the power-grid and water distribution
systems, previous work by the authors and co-workers has shown that even smaller systems,
such as cars, can be attacked. It was shown in [2] how to attack the velocity measurements of
anti-lock braking systems so as to force drivers to loose control of their vehicles.
In this paper we propose two state observers for discrete-time linear systems in the presence
of sparsely corrupted measurements. Sparse “noise” is a natural model to describe the effect
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2of a malicious attacker that has the ability to alter the measurements of a subset of sensors in
a feedback control loop. While measurements originating from un-attacked sensors are “noise”
free, measurements from attacked sensors can be arbitrary: we make no assumption regarding
its magnitude, statistical description, or temporal evolution. Hence, the noise vector is sparse;
its elements are either zero or arbitrary real numbers.
Several results on state reconstruction under sensor attacks have recently appeared in the
literature. We classify the existing work in two classes based on how the physical plant is
modeled: 1) steady-state operation (no dynamics) and 2) linear time-invariant dynamics. In both
classes the attacker is assumed to corrupt a few sensor measurements and thus its actions are
adequately modeled as sparse noise.
The results reported in [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] fall in the first class – steady state operation –
and address security problems in the context of smart power grid systems. Due to the steady
state assumption, all of these results fail to exploit the constraints imposed by the continuous
dynamics as done in this paper.
Representative work in the second class – linear time-invariant dynamics – includes [8],
[9], [10], [11]. The work reported in [8] addresses the detection of attacks through monitors
inspired by the fault detection and isolation literature. Such methods are better suited for small
systems since the number of monitors grows combinatorially with the number of sensors. The
work reported in [9], [10], [11] draws inspiration from error correction over the reals [12]
and compressive sensing [13] and formulates the secure state reconstruction problem as a
Lr\L1, r > 1 optimization problem.
The problem of reconstructing the state under sensor attacks is closely related to fault-tolerant
state reconstruction. The robust Kalman filter, described in [14], is the approach to fault-tolerant
state reconstruction closer to the results in this paper, at the technical level. In robust Kalman
filtering the state estimate updates are obtained by solving a convex L1 optimization problem
that is robust to outliers. With the advances in the computational power of current processors, the
robust Kalman filter can be efficiently computed in real-time. However, no theoretical guarantees
are known regarding the performance of this filter in the presence of malicious attacks.
In this paper, we extend the work in [9], [10], [11] by focusing on efficient algorithms in
the sense of being implementable on computationally limited platforms. Rather than relying on
classical algorithms for Lr\L1, r > 1 optimization, as was done in [9], [10], [11], we develop
September 22, 2014 DRAFT
3in this paper customized gradient-descent algorithms which have lightweight implementations.
The computational efficiency claims are supported by numerical simulations showing an order
of magnitude decrease in the computation time.
The proposed algorithms reconstruct both the state as well as the sparse noise/attack signal.
Hence, they can be seen as an extension of compressive sensing techniques to the case where
part of the signal to be reconstructed is sparse and the other part is governed by linear dynamics.
A similar problem is studied in [15] where the recovery of a sparse streaming signal with linear
dynamics is discussed. Although the work in [15] also exploits the linear dynamics, it is not
applicable to the state reconstruction problem where the sparse signal models an attack for which
no dynamics is known.
Technically, we make the following contributions:
• The reconstruction or decoding of compressively sensed signals is characterized by prop-
erties such as the restricted isometry or the restricted eigenvalues [13]. We show that the
relevant notion in our case is a strong notion of observability.
• We extend one of the algorithms previously proposed for the reconstruction or decoding of
compressively sensed signals [16] to the case where part of the signal is sparse while the
rest is governed by linear dynamics.
• We propose a recursive implementation of the method discussed in the previous bullet so
that new measurement information can be used as it becomes available, in the spirit of a
Luenberger observer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formally introduces the problem
under consideration. The notions of s-observability and s-restricted eigenvalues are introduced
in Section III. The main results of this paper which are the Event-Triggered Projected Gradient-
Descent algorithm and the Event-Triggered Projected Luenberger Observer, along with their
convergence properties, are presented in Sections IV and V, respectively. Simulation results for
the proposed algorithms are shown in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. THE SECURE STATE RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEM
A. Notation
The symbols N0,R, and R+ denote the set of natural, real, and positive real numbers, re-
spectively. Given two vectors x ∈ Rn1 and y ∈ Rn2 , we denote by (x, y) ∈ Rn1+n2 the vector
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xT yT
]T
. We also use the notation zx and zy to denote the natural projection of the vector
z = (x, y) on its first and second component, respectively.
If S is a set, we denote by |S| the cardinality of S. The support of a vector x ∈ Rn, denoted
by supp(x), is the set of indices of the non-zero elements of x. We call a vector x ∈ Rn s-sparse,
if x has at most s nonzero elements, i.e., if |supp(x)| ≤ s. A vector z = (x1, x2, . . . , xp) ∈ Rnp
is called cyclic s-sparse, if each xi ∈ Rn is s-sparse for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} and supp(x1) =
supp(x2) = . . . = supp(xp). With some abuse of notation, we use s-sparse to denote cyclic
s-sparse.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, we denote by ‖x‖2 the 2-norm of x and by ‖M‖2 the induced 2-norm of
a matrix M ∈ Rm×n. We also denote by Mi ∈ R1×n the ith row of M . For a set Γ ⊆ {1, . . . ,m},
we denote by MΓ ∈ R|Γ|×n the matrix obtained from M by removing all the rows except those
indexed by Γ. We also denote by MΓ ∈ R(m−|Γ|)×n the matrix obtained from M by removing
the rows indexed by the set Γ, for example, if m = 4, and Γ = {1, 2}, then:
MΓ =
M1
M2
 and MΓ =
M3
M4
 .
For any finite set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} ⊂ N we denote by rS and r + S, r ∈ N, the sets
rS = {rs1, rs2, . . . , rsk} and r+S = {r+ s1, r+ s2, . . . r+ sk}, respectively. Finally we denote
the set of eigenvalues, the minimum eigenvalue, and the maximum eigenvalue of a symmetric
matrix M by λ{M}, λmin{M}, and λmax{M} respectively.
B. Dynamics and Attack Model
Consider the following linear discrete-time control system where x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state
at time t ∈ N0, u(t) ∈ Rm is the system input, and y(t) ∈ Rp is the observed measurement:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (II.1)
y(t) = Cx(t) + a(t). (II.2)
The matrices A,B, and C have appropriate dimensions and a(t) ∈ Rp is a s-sparse vector
modeling how an attacker changed the sensor measurements at time t. If sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , p}
is attacked then the ith element in the vector a(t) is non-zero otherwise the ith sensor is not
attacked. Hence, s describes the number of attacked sensors. Note that we make no assumptions
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5on the vector a(t) other than being s-sparse. In particular, we do not assume bounds, statistical
properties, nor restrictions on the time evolution of the elements in a(t). The value of s is also
not assumed to be known although we assume the knowledge of an upper bound. The set of
sensors the attacker has access to is assumed to remain constant over time (and has cardinality
at most s). However, the attacker has complete freedom in deciding which sensor or sensors in
this set are attacked and when, including the possibility of attacking all of them at all times.
Our objective is to simultaneously construct a delayed version of the state, x(t−τ+1), and the
cyclic s-sparse attack vector E(t) = (a(t−τ +1), a(t−τ +2), . . . , a(t)) from the measurements
y(t− τ + 1), y(t− τ + 2), . . . , y(t).
It is worth explaining the cyclic sparse nature of E(t) in more detail. Consider the attack vector
E(t) = (a(t− τ + 1), a(t− τ + 2), . . . , a(t)) and reformat this data as the matrix E˜(t) ∈ Rp×τ
where column i is given by a(t− i + 1). Since we assume that the set of sensors under attack
does not change over time, the sparsity pattern appears in E˜(t). The rows corresponding to the
un-attacked sensors will only have zeros, while the rows corresponding to the attacked sensors
will have arbitrary (zero or non-zero) elements.
Example II.1. Consider a system with 4 sensors, τ = 4, and an attack on the second and third
sensors. The attack matrix E˜(t) will be of the form:
E˜(t) =

0 0 0 0
2 5 6 10
4 8 0 12
0 0 0 0
 .
The cyclic sparsity structure appears once the attack matrix E˜(t) is reshaped as the vector E(t):
E(t) =
[
0 2 4 0 0 5 8 0 . . .
]T
.
Since cyclic s-sparse vectors pervade this paper, it is convenient to denote them by a special
symbol.
Definition II.2 (Cyclic s-sparse set Ss). The subset of Rpτ consisting of the vectors that are
cyclic r-sparse for all r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s}, s ≤ p, is denoted by Ss.
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6Using this cyclic sparsity notion, we pose two problems which will lead to the two proposed
algorithms.
C. Static Batch Optimization
By collecting τ ∈ N observations with τ ≤ n, we can write the output equation as:
Y˜ (t) = Ox(t− τ + 1) + E(t) + FU(t)
=
[
O I
]x(t− τ + 1)
E(t)
+ FU(t)
= Qz(t) + FU(t),
where:
z(t) =

x(t− τ + 1)
a(t− τ + 1)
a(t− τ + 2)
...
a(t)

=
x(t− τ + 1)
E(t)
 , E(t) =

a(t− τ + 1)
a(t− τ + 2)
...
a(t)
 ,
O =

C
CA
...
CAτ−1
 , Q =
[
O I
]
, (II.3)
F =

0 0 . . . 0 0
CB 0 . . . 0 0
... . . .
...
CAτ−2B CAτ−3B . . . CB 0
 , Y˜ (t) =

y(t− τ + 1)
y(t− τ + 2)
...
y(t)
 , U(t) =

u(t− τ + 1)
u(t− τ + 2)
...
u(t)
 .
Since all the inputs in the vector U(t) are known, we can further simplify the output equation
to:
Y (t) = Qz(t),
where Y (t) = Y˜ (t)− FU(t).
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7Problem II.3. (Static Batch Optimization) For the linear control system defined by (II.1) and
(II.2) construct the estimate zˆ = (xˆ, Eˆ), where xˆ ∈ Rn is the state estimate and Eˆ ∈ Ss is the
attack vector estimate, obtained as the solution of the following optimization problem:
arg min
zˆ∈Rn×Ss
1
2
‖Y −Qzˆ‖22 .
We dropped the time t argument since this optimization problem is to be solved at every
time instance. We note that we seek a solution in the non-convex set Rn × Ss and no closed-
form solution is known for this problem. Note also that this optimization problem asks for the
reconstruction of a delayed version of the state x(t−τ+1). However, we can always reconstruct
of the current state x(t) from x(t− τ + 1) by recursively rolling the dynamics forward in time.
Alternatively, when A is invertible, we can directly recover x(t) by re-writing the measurement
equation as a function of x(t).
As a final remark we note that it follows from the Cayley-Hamilton theorem that there is no
loss of generality in taking the number of collected measurements τ to be no greater than the
number of states n.
D. Luenberger-like Observer
Problem II.3 asks for the reconstruction of z(t) using a batch approach based on the measured
data in the vector Y . On computationally restricted platforms we may be faced with the difficulty
of having to process new measurements before being able to compute a solution to Problem
II.3. It would then be preferable to reconstruct z(t) using an algorithm that can incorporate new
measurements as they become available. This motivates the following problem.
Problem II.4. (Luenberger-like Observer) For the linear control system defined by (II.1) and
(II.2) construct a dynamical system:
zˆ(t+ 1) = f(zˆ(t), U(t), Y (t)),
such that:
lim
t→∞
(z∗(t)− zˆ(t)) = 0,
where z∗(t) = (x∗(t− τ + 1), E∗(t)) ∈ Rn × Ss, x∗(t) is the solution of (II.1) under the inputs
U(t), and Y (t) is the sequence of the last τ observed outputs corrupted by E∗(t).
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8III. s-SPARSE OBSERVABILITY AND THE RESTRICTED EIGENVALUE
Recall that Problem II.3 asks for the minimizer of 1
2
‖Y − Qzˆ‖22. Since the matrix Q has a
non trivial kernel, there exist many pairs zˆ = (xˆ, Eˆ) which solve this problem. In this section
we look closely at the fundamental question of uniqueness of solutions.
A. s-Sparse Observability
We start by introducing the following notion of observability.
Definition III.1. (s-Sparse Observable System) The linear control system defined by (II.1) and
(II.2) is said to be s-sparse observable if for every set Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , p} with |Γ| = s, the pair
(A,CΓ) is observable.
In other words, a system is s-sparse observable if it remains observable after eliminating any
choice of s sensors. This strong notion of observability underlies most of the results in this paper
and can also be expressed using the notion of strong observability for linear systems described
in [17], [18]. To make this connection explicit, consider a linear system (A;B = 0;C;D = Ia)
where the attack signal a(t) is regarded as an input and Ia is the diagonal matrix defined so
that the ith element on the diagonal is zero whenever ai(t) is zero and is one otherwise. Since
in our formulation we assume no knowledge of the support of the attack signal a(t), we need
to consider all the different supports for the attack vector. It is then not difficult to see that a
linear system is s-sparse observable if and only if the systems (A;B = 0;C;D = Ia) are strong
observable for all the matrices Ia obtained by considering attack vectors with all the possible
supports.
We use the notion of s-sparse observability to characterize the uniqueness of solutions to
Problem II.3.
Theorem III.2. (Existence and uniqueness of solutions to Problem II.3) Problem II.3 has a
unique solution, i.e., the function 1
2
‖Y −Qzˆ‖22 has a unique minimum on the set Rn×Ss, if and
only if the linear dynamical system defined by (II.1) and (II.2) is 2s-sparse observable.
Proof: We first note that ‖Y −Qz‖22 is always non-negative and it becomes zero whenever
x is the true state and E is the true attack vector. Hence, ‖Y −Ox−E‖22 has a unique minimum
if and only if the equality Y = Qz = Ox + E only holds for the true state and the true attack
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9vector. However, this is equivalent to injectivity of the map f : Rn × Ss → Rpτ defined by
f(x,E) = Ox+ E.
To prove the stated result we assume, for the sake of contradiction, that f is not injective and
(A,C) is 2s-sparse observable. Since f is not injective there exist (x,E), (x′, E ′) ∈ Rn × Ss
such that f(x,E) = f(x′, E ′). Moreover, it follows from the definition of f that x 6= x′. We
now note that:
f(x,E) = f(x′, E ′)⇔ Ox+ E = Ox′ + E ′ ⇔ O(x− x′) = E ′ − E.
Since the support of a and a′ is at most s, the support of E ′−E is at most 2s. Let Γ = supp(E ′ − E)
be the set consisting of the indices where E ′−E is supported. Then, O(x−x′) = E ′−E implies
OΓ(x − x′) = 0 which in turn implies that the pair (A,CΓ) is not observable since x 6= x′, a
contradiction.
Conversely, if the pair (A,CΓ) is not observable there is a non-zero vector v ∈ kerOΓ. Fix
x ∈ Rn and let x′ = x+ v. Since OΓ(x− x′) = 0, the support of O(x− x′) is at most |Γ| = 2s.
Split Γ in two sets Γ1 and Γ2 so that Γ = Γ1 ∪Γ2, |Γ1| ≤ s and |Γ2| ≤ s. We can now define E
by making its ith entry Ei to be equal to (O(x− x′))i if i ∈ Γ1 and zero otherwise. Similarly,
we define E ′ by making its ith entry E ′i to be equal to (O(x−x′))i if i ∈ Γ2 and zero otherwise.
As defined, the support of E and E ′ is at most s and the equality f(x,E) = f(x′, E ′) holds
thereby showing that f is not injective.
Although the notion of s-sparse observability is of combinatorial nature, since we have to check
observability of all possible pairs (A,CΓ), it does clearly illustrate a fundamental limitation: it is
impossible to correctly reconstruct the state whenever p/2 or more sensors are attacked. Indeed,
suppose that we have an even number of sensors p and s = p/2 sensors are attacked. Theorem
III.2 requires the system to still be observable after removing 2s = p rows from the matrix C
which leads to CΓ being the linear transformation mapping every state to zero. This fundamental
limitation is consistent with and had been previously reported in [9], [10], [18].
In [9], [10], the possibility of reconstructing the state under sensor attacks is characterized
by Proposition 2 and under certain assumptions on the A matrix by Proposition 4. The charac-
terization based on s-sparse observability complements the characterizations in [9], [10] in the
following sense. Proposition 2 in [9], [10] requires a test to be performed for every state x ∈ Rn
and does not lead to an effective algorithm. In contrast, s-sparse observability only requires a
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finite, albeit large, number of computations. Proposition 4 in [9], [10] requires an even smaller
number of tests than s-sparse observability but only applies under additional assumptions on
the A matrix. Moreover, s-sparse observability connects the state reconstruction problem under
sensor attacks to the well known systems theoretic notion of observability.
B. s-Restricted Eigenvalue
While s-sparse observability provides a qualitative characterization of the existence and unique-
ness of solutions to Problem II.3, in this section we discuss a more quantitative version termed
the s-restricted eigenvalue property [19]. This property is directly related to the possibility of
solving Problem II.3 and Problem II.4 using gradient descent inspired methods.
Definition III.3. (s-Restricted Eigenvalue of a Linear Control System) For a given set Γ˜s ⊆ {1, . . . , p}
with |Γ˜s| = p− s, let Γs be defined by:
Γs = Γ˜s ∪ pΓ˜s ∪ 2pΓ˜s ∪ . . . ∪ (τ − 1)pΓ˜s (III.1)
and define (with some abuse of notation) the matrix QΓs ∈ Rpτ×(n+sτ) as the matrix obtained
from Q =
[
O I
]
by removing from I the columns indexed by Γs, i.e.:
QΓs =
[
O (IΓs)T
]
. (III.2)
The s-restricted eigenvalue of the control system defined by (II.1) and (II.2) is the the smallest
eigenvalue of all the matrices QT
Γs
QΓs obtained by considering all the different sets Γ˜s.
The s-restricted eigenvalue of a control system can be related to the s-observability as follows.
Proposition III.4. (Non-zero Restricted Eigenvalue) Let the linear control system, defined
by (II.1) and (II.2), be 2s-sparse observable. There exists a δ2s ∈ R+ such that for every
z = (x,E) ∈ Rn × S2s the 2s-restricted eigenvalue is no smaller than δ2s.
In other words, although Q has a non-trivial kernel, QTQ has a non-zero minimum eigenvalue
when operating on a vector z = (x,E) with cyclic 2s-sparse zE , i.e., the following inequality
holds if z = (x,E) ∈ Rn × S2s:
0 < δ2sz
T z ≤ zTQTQz. (III.3)
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Proof: Inequality (III.3) follows directly from Theorem III.2 which states that Qz 6= 0
for any z = (x,E) 6= 0 with zE cyclic 2s-sparse. This is equivalent to zTQTQz > 0. Define
Γ2s = supp(zE) and Γ = n+ Γ2s. Now note that zTQTQz = zTΓQ
T
Γ2s
QΓ2szΓ and hence:
λmin
{
QT
Γ2s
QΓ2s
}
zT
Γ
zΓ ≤ zTΓQTΓ2sQΓ2szΓ,
from which we conclude that inequality (III.3) holds with:
δ2s = min
Γ2s
λmin
{
QT
Γ2s
QΓ2s
}
,
where Γ2s is defined in (III.1).
Similarly to 2s-sparse observability, the computation of δ2s is combinatorial in nature since
one needs to calculate the eigenvalues of QT
Γ2s
QΓ2s for all the different sets Γ2s.
IV. EVENT TRIGGERED PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT
The problem of reconstructing a sparse signal from measurements is well studied in the
compressive sensing literature [20], [21]. In this section we present an algorithm for state
reconstruction that can be seen as an extension of the iterative hard thresholding algorithm,
reported in [16], to the case where part of the signal to be reconstructed is sparse and part
is governed by linear dynamics. We also draw inspiration from [22] where it is shown how
to interpret optimization algorithms as dynamical systems with feedback. Once this link is
established, Lyapunov analysis techniques become available to design as well as to analyze
the performance of optimization algorithms.
A. The Algorithm
The Event Triggered Projected Gradient Descent (ETPG) algorithm updates the estimate
zˆ ∈ Rn × Rpτ of z ∈ Rn × Rpτ by following the gradient direction of the Lyapunov candidate
function V (zˆ) = 1
2
‖Y −Qzˆ‖22, i.e.
zˆ+ := zˆ + ηQT (Y −Qzˆ)
for some step size η. Since zˆ will not, in general, satisfy the desired sparsity constraints, gradient
steps are alternated with projection steps using the projection operator:
Π : Rn × Rpτ → Rn × Ss
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that takes zˆ ∈ Rn × Rpτ to the closest point in Rn × Ss. In order to ensure that V decreases
along the execution of the algorithm, multiple gradient steps are performed for each projection
step. By monitoring the evolution of V , the algorithm can determine when the decrease in V
caused by the gradient steps compensates the increase caused by Π. This is akin to triggering
an event in event-triggered control [23].
Define the error vector as e = z∗ − zˆ (where z∗ denotes the solution of Problem II.3) and
note that eE = z∗E − zˆE is, at most, 2s-sparse whenever zˆE is at most s-sparse. From Theorem
III.2 we know that the intersection of the cyclic 2s-sparse set S2s with the kernel of Q is only
one point, e = 0, which corresponds to zˆ = z∗. Hence, by driving V (zˆ) to zero while forcing
zˆE to be cyclic s-sparse, zˆ is guaranteed to converge to z∗. Formalizing these ideas leads to
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Event-Triggered Projected Gradient Descent
1: Initialize k := 1, m := 0, zˆ(0)Π := 0;
2: while V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
> 0 do
3: zˆ(k,0) := zˆ
(k−1)
Π ;
4: reset m := 0, Vtemp := V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
;
5: while Vtemp ≥ V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
do
6: zˆ(k,m+1) := zˆ(k,m) + ηQT
(
Y −Qzˆ(k,m));
7: Vtemp := V
(
Π(zˆ(k,m+1))
)
;
8: m := m+ 1;
9: end while
10: zˆ
(k)
Π := Π(zˆ
(k,m));
11: k := k + 1;
12: end while
13: return zˆ(k)Π
A typical execution of the ETPG algorithm is illustrated in Figure 1 where the evolution of the
Lyapunov candidate function V is shown. We can see that at k = 0, 1 the ETPG algorithm applied
one gradient step before applying the new projection step, while at k = 2 and k = 8 two gradient
steps were executed to compensate for the increase in V caused by the projection step. This
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Fig. 1. An example of the evolution of the Lyapunov candidate function V while running the ETPG algorithm. The subsequence
highlighted in blue (dashed) is a decreasing subsequence.
adaptive nature of the ETPG algorithm is a consequence of the event-triggering mechanism. The
algorithm ensures that the subsequence depicted in blue in Figure 1 is a converging subsequence
and thus stability in the Lyapunov sense is attained.
The ETPG algorithm uses two counters, one for each loop. Accordingly, we will use the
notation zˆ(k,m) where k counts the number of iterations of the outer loop, while m counts the
number of internal gradient descent steps within each iteration of the inner loop.
B. The Projection Operator
Before discussing the convergence of the proposed algorithm, it is important to show how to
compute the projection operator Π.
Definition IV.1. Given a vector z = (x,E) ∈ Rn × Rpτ , we denote by Π(z) the element of
Rn × Ss closest to z in the 2-norm sense, i.e.,
‖Π(z)− z‖2 ≤ ‖z′ − z‖2 , (IV.1)
for any z′ ∈ Rn × Ss.
We first note that Π(z) = Π(x,E) = (x,Π′(E)). To explain how Π′ is computed, recall from
Example II.1 the matrix E˜ obtained by formatting E ∈ Rpτ so that the ith column of E˜ is given
by a(t− i+1). Now, define E ∈ Rp by Ei =
∥∥∥E˜i∥∥∥2
2
. By noting that ‖E‖22 =
∥∥E∥∥2
2
and that E is
cyclic s-sparse if and only if E is s-sparse, it immediately follows that Π′(z) can be computed
by setting to zero the elements of E corresponding to the smallest p− s entries of E.
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Example IV.2. Let us consider the following example with p = 3, τ = 2 and s = 1:
E =
[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
]T
∈ Rpτ
Hence,
E˜ =

1 4 7
2 5 8
3 6 9
 ∈ Rp×τ , E =

66
93
126
 ∈ Rp, Π′(E) =

0
0
126
 ∈ Rp,
which leads to:
Π′(E) =
[
0 0 3 0 0 6 0 0 9
]T
.
C. Convergence of the ETPG Algorithm
In this subsection we discuss the convergence and performance of the ETPG algorithm. The
main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem IV.3. (Convergence of the ETPG algorithm) Let the linear control system defined
by (II.1) and (II.2) be 2s-sparse observable with 2s-restricted eigenvalue δ2s and let z∗ =
(x∗, E∗) ∈ Rn× Ss denote the solution of Problem II.3. The ETPG algorithm converges to z∗ if
the following holds:
1) 0 < η < 2λ−1max{QTQ},
2) δ2s > 49λmax{QTQ}.
Remark IV.4. Theorem IV.3 shows that the ETPG algorithm correctly reconstructs the state
whenever the attacker has access to no more than s sensors and the system is 2s-sparse
observable. In practice, one does not exactly know the number s of attacked sensors. However, if
an upper bound s is known, the ETPG is guaranteed to work as long as the system is 2s-sparse
observable. For this reason the ETPG algorithm is run with the largest s for which 2s-spare
observability holds.
Remark IV.5. The ETPG algorithm can be seen as a generalization of the “Normalized Iterative
Hard Thresholding” (NIHT) algorithm presented in [24]. The ETPG algorithm uses multiple
gradient descent steps supervised by an event-triggering mechanism whereas the NIHT algorithm
only uses one gradient step. These two ingredients, multiple gradient steps and event-triggering,
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result in weaker conditions for convergence: δ2s > 49λmax{QTQ} for the ETPG algorithm vs
δ2s >
8
9
λmax{QTQ} for the NIHT algorithm (Theorem 4 in [24]).
In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on proving this theorem by resorting to the
Lyapunov candidate function:
W (zˆ) = ‖z∗ − zˆ‖2 = ‖e‖2 .
Note that, unlike V , the Lyapunov candidate function W has a unique minimum at zˆ = z∗.
However, one should note that evaluation of W requires the knowledge of z∗ which we do not
have a priori. Accordingly, W is only adequate to discuss stability but can not be used to design
the ETPG algorithm.
The proof is divided into small steps. First we discuss the effect of the two operations used
inside the ETPG algorithm: projection and gradient descent. This is done in Propositions IV.6,
IV.7, and IV.8. Next we provide sufficient conditions under which the inner loop is guaranteed
to terminate. These are given in Proposition IV.10. Finally, we use the triggering condition to
establish that W is a Lyapunov function.
1) Effect of the Projection Operator:
Proposition IV.6. The following inequality holds for any z ∈ Rn × Rpτ :
W ◦ Π(z) ≤ 2W (z).
Proof: The result is proved by direct computation as follows:
W ◦ Π(z) = ‖z∗ − Π(z)‖2 ≤ ‖z∗ − z‖2 + ‖Π(z)− z‖2 ≤ 2 ‖z∗ − z‖2 = 2W (z),
where the first inequality follows from the triangular inequality and the second inequality follows
from (IV.1).
2) Effect of Gradient Steps: In this subsection we study the effect of the gradient descent step
along with sufficient conditions for termination of the inner loop of the ETPG algorithm. The
first proposition is a technical result used in the proof of the second proposition that characterizes
the decease in W caused by gradient descent steps.
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Proposition IV.7. Let the linear control system defined by (II.1) and (II.2) be 2s-sparse observ-
able with 2s-restricted eigenvalue δ2s. The following holds for any z ∈ Rn × S2s:∥∥(I −Q+Q)z∥∥
2
≤ (1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ})
1
2 ‖z‖2
where Q+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse of Q.
Proof: The result follows from direct computations as follows:∥∥(I −Q+Q)z∥∥2
2
= zT (I −Q+Q)2z (a)= zT (I −Q+Q)z (b)= zT (I −QT (QQT )−1Q)z
(c)
≤ zT (I − λ−1max{QTQ}QTQ)z
(d)
≤ (1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ})zT z
where equality: (a) follows by noticing that the projection operator I −Q+Q is idempotent; (b)
follows from the definition of Q+ = QT (QQT )−1; (c) follows from the fact that QQT = I+OOT
is a positive definite matrix and hence the inverse (QQT )−1 exists and can be bounded as
(QQT )−1 ≥ λ−1max{QTQ}I; and (d) follow from the 2s-sparse observability assumption along
with Proposition III.4.
Proposition IV.8. Let the linear control system defined by (II.1) and (II.2) be 2s-sparse observ-
able with 2s-restricted eigenvalue δ2s. If the following conditions hold:
1) the estimate zˆ(k,0)E is s-sparse, i.e., zˆ
(k,0) =
(
zˆ
(k,0)
x , zˆ
(k,0)
E
)
∈ Rn × Ss,
2) the step size η satisfies η < 2λ−1max{QTQ},
then for any ε ∈ R+, the following inequality holds for any m ≥
⌈
log ε
log(1−ηδ2s)
⌉
W
(
zˆ(k,m)
) ≤ ((1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ}) 12 + ε)W (zˆ(k,0)) , (IV.2)
where zˆ(k,m) ∈ Rn × Rpτ is recursively defined by:
zˆ(k,m+1) := zˆ(k,m) + ηQT
(
Y −Qzˆ(k,m)) .
Proof: The Lyapunov candidate function W
(
zˆ(k,m)
)
, after taking one gradient descent step,
can be written as follows:
W
(
zˆ(k,m)
)
=
∥∥z∗ − zˆ(k,m)∥∥
2
=
∥∥z∗ − zˆ(k,m−1) − ηQT (Y −Qzˆ(k,m−1))∥∥
2
=
∥∥z∗ − zˆ(k,m−1) − ηQT (Qz∗ −Qzˆ(k,m−1))∥∥
2
=
∥∥e(k,m−1) − ηQTQe(k,m−1)∥∥
2
.
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Recursively extending the previous analysis to m steps we obtain:
W
(
zˆ(k,m)
)
=
∥∥(I − ηQTQ)me(k,0)∥∥
2
. (IV.3)
Now define the projection error (m) as:
(m) = (I −Q+Q)− (I − ηQTQ)m (IV.4)
where Q+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse of Q. It follows from Corollary 3 in [25] that:
‖(m)‖2 ≤ (1− ηδ2s)m .
Given any ε ∈ R+, we conclude that in no more than:⌈
log ε
log (1− ηδ2s)
⌉
steps, the projection error ‖(m)‖2 satisfies ‖(m)‖2 ≤ ε. Hence:
W
(
zˆ(k,m)
) (a)
=
∥∥(I −Q+Q)e(k,0) − (m)e(k,0)∥∥
2
(b)
≤ ∥∥(I −Q+Q)e(k,0)∥∥
2
+
∥∥(m)e(k,0)∥∥
2
(c)
≤
((
1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ}
) 1
2 + ‖(m)‖2
)∥∥e(k,0)∥∥
2
≤
((
1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ}
) 1
2 + ε
)
W
(
zˆ(k,0)
)
where the equality: (a) follows by substituting (IV.4) in (IV.3); (b) follows from the triangular
inequality; and (c) follows from Proposition IV.7 and the first assumption which guarantees that
zˆ
(k,0)
E is s-sparse and hence z
∗
E − zˆ(k,0)E is at most 2s-sparse.
Remark IV.9. It follows from the previous analysis that we can replace the inner loop in
Algorithm 1 with a one step projection of zˆ on the kernel of Q, that is, Algorithm 1 can be
simplified to the alternation between the following two steps:
zˆ(k+1) := zˆ
(k)
Π +Q
+
(
Y −Qzˆ(k)Π
)
,
zˆ
(k+1)
Π := Π
(
zˆ(k+1)
)
.
However, since computing the pseudo inverse matrix Q+ can, in general, suffer from numerical
issues, we argue that using the gradient descent algorithm (or any other recursive implementation
that computes Q+, e.g., Newton method, conjugate gradients, ...) is preferable.
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3) Termination of the ETPG’s Inner Loop: In the following result, we establish sufficient
conditions for termination of the inner loop.
Proposition IV.10. Let the linear control system defined by (II.1) and (II.2) be 2s-sparse
observable with 2s-restricted eigenvalue δ2s. If the following holds:
1) 0 < η < 2λ−1max{QTQ},
2) δ2s > 49λmax{QTQ}
then, after no more than:  log
3
2
(
δ2sλ
−1
max
{
QTQ
}) 1
2 − 1
log (1− ηδ2s)
 (IV.5)
inner loop iterations, the inner loop condition V
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
< V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
is satisfied.
Proof: Before we start, we recall that V
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
= V
(
zˆ(k,0)
)
= 1
2
∥∥Y −Qzˆ(k,0)∥∥2
2
= 1
2
∥∥Qe(k,0)∥∥2
2
.
It follows from the definition of e(k,0) = z∗ − Π(z(k−1,m)) that e(k,0)E is at most 2s-sparse.
Accordingly, inequality (III.3) holds as follows:
δ2s
2
W 2
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
≤ V
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
≤ λmax{Q
TQ}
2
W 2
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
(IV.6)
Hence, if we can prove that applying
⌈
log 3
2(δ2sλ
−1
max{QTQ}) 12−1
log(1−ηδ2s)
⌉
gradient descent steps followed
by a projection step implies that:
W 2
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
< δ2sλ
−1
max{QTQ}W 2
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
(IV.7)
holds, we can combine (IV.7) with (IV.6) to obtain:
V
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
≤ λmax{Q
TQ}
2
W 2
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
<
δ2s
2
W 2
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
≤ V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
and conclude that the inner loop condition is satisfied. Therefore, to finalize the proof we need
to show that inequality (IV.7) holds. This follows directly from:
W
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
= W
(
zˆ(k,0)
)
=
∥∥z∗ − Π(zˆ(k−1,m))∥∥
2
(a)
≤ 2W (zˆ(k−1,m))
(b)
≤ 2
((
1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ}
) 1
2 + ε
)
W
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
where the inequality (a) follows from Proposition IV.6 while inequality (b) follows from Proposi-
tion IV.8. To conclude the result, we need to show that the factor 2
((
1− δ2sλ−1max{QTQ}
) 1
2 + ε
)
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is strictly less than (δ2sλ−1max{QTQ})
1
2 . But this follows directly from assumption 2):
δ2sλ
−1
max
{
QTQ
}
>
4
9
⇒ 3 (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12 > 2
⇒ 2
(
1− (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12) < (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12
⇒ 2
(
1− (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12)+ 2ε < (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12
for any ε satisfying:
2ε <
(
δ2sλ
−1
max
{
QTQ
}) 1
2 − 2
(
1− (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12) = 3 (δ2sλ−1max {QTQ}) 12 − 2.
D. Stability of ETPG Algorithm
Using the previous results, we can now show convergence of the ETPG algorithm.
Proof of Theorem IV.3: Convergence of the algorithm, in the Lyapunov sense, follows
directly from the termination of the inner loop shown in Proposition IV.10. Consider the following
sequence:
Y (k,m) =
√
2
δ2s
V (zˆ(k,0)) =
√
2
δ2s
1
2
‖Qe(k,0)‖22
We first show that this sequence forms an upper bound for W
(
zˆ(k,m)
)
. For m = 0, it follows
from the definition of e(k,0) = z∗ − zˆ(k,0) = z∗ − Π(zˆ(k−1,m)) that e(k,0)E is at most 2s-sparse.
Accordingly inequality (IV.6) holds as follows:
δ2s
2
W 2
(
zˆ(k,0)
) ≤ V (zˆ(k,0))⇒ W (zˆ(k,0)) ≤ Y (k,0) (IV.8)
Note that upper bound (IV.8) is satisfied only when Eˆ is cyclic s-sparse. Thus it is only applicable
after applying the projection operator, i.e., when m = 0. We now extend this bound for m > 0
as follows:
W
(
zˆ(k,m)
)
< W
(
zˆ(k,0)
)
= Y (k,0) = Y (k,m), (IV.9)
where the inequality follows from Proposition IV.8 along with assumption 2).
Since 0 ≤ W (zˆ(k,m)) ≤ Y (k,m), and by the triggering condition V (zˆ(k+1)Π ) < V (zˆ(k)Π ) we
have:
lim
k→∞
Y (k,m) = lim
k→∞
√
2
δ2s
V (zˆ(k,0)) = 0
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and we conclude:
lim
k→∞
W
(
zˆ(k,0)
)
= 0.
V. AN EVENT-TRIGGERED PROJECTED LUENBERGER OBSERVER
In this section we describe a solution to Problem II.4 obtained by rendering the ETPG
algorithm recursive.
A. The Algorithm
We start again with the linear dynamical system defined by (II.1) and (II.2). The dynamics of
z(t) = (x(t− τ + 1), E(t)) ∈ Rn ×Rpτ can be written, using the equality a(t) = y(t)− Cx(t),
as follows:
x(t− τ + 1)
a(t− τ + 1)
...
a(t)
 =

A 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 I . . . 0
...
−CAτ 0 0 . . . 0


x(t− τ)
a(t− τ)
...
a(t− 1)
+

B 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
...
...
−CAτ−3B −CAτ−2B . . . −CB


u(t− τ)
u(t− τ + 1)
...
u(t− 1)
+

0
0
...
I
 y(t),

y(t− τ)
y(t− τ + 1)
...
y(t− 1)
 =

C
CA
...
CAτ
x(t− τ) +

a(t− τ)
a(t− τ + 1)
...
a(t− 1)
+ FU(t− 1)
or in the more compact form:
z(t) = Az(t− 1) +Bu¯(t− 1)
Y (t− 1) = Qz(t− 1),
September 22, 2014 DRAFT
21
where:
A =

A 0 . . . 0
0 I . . . 0
... . . .
0 0 . . . I
−CAτ 0 . . . 0

, B =

B 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0 0
−CAτ−3B −CAτ−2B . . . −CB I

,
Y (t − 1) = Y˜ (t − 1) − FU(t − 1), u¯(t − 1) =
U(t− 1)
y(t)
, and z(t), Y˜ (t), U(t), Q, F are as
defined as in Section II.
The Event-Triggered Projected Luenberger (ETPL) Observer consist of the iteration of the
following two steps:
a) Time Update: Starting from an estimate zˆΠ(t−1) = (xˆ(t−1), EˆΠ(t−1)) with EˆΠ(t−1)
s-sparse, we use the dynamics to update the previous estimate:
zˆ(t) = AzˆΠ(t− 1) +Bu(t− 1).
This may result in an increase in the value of the Lyapunov candidate function V .
b) Event-Triggered Projected Luenberger (Measurement) Update: In this step, we alternate
between applying the Luenberger update step:
zˆ(m+1)(t) = zˆ(m)(t) + L
(
Y (t)−Qzˆ(m)(t)) ,
multiple times followed by the projection operator Π once:
zˆΠ(t) = Π
(
zˆ(m)(t)
)
.
It follows from the proof of Theorem IV.3 that alternating between multiple Luenberger updates
(which is the generalization of the gradient descent step when L = QTΣ for some positive
definite matrix Σ) and projection steps forces a decrease of the Lyapunov candidate function
V (zˆ(t)) = 1
2
‖Y (t)−Qzˆ(t)‖22. In order to compensate for the increase introduced by the time
update step, we need to ensure that V decreases along the execution of the algorithm. Hence,
multiple Luenberger updates and projection steps are performed for each time-update step. Using
the same triggering technique, by monitoring the evolution of V , the algorithm can determine
when the decrease in V caused by the Luenberger update/projection steps compensates the
increase caused by the time-update. This sequence of steps results in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Event Triggered Projected Luenberger Observer
a) Time Update:
zˆ(t) = Azˆ(t− 1) +Bu(t− 1);
b) Event-Triggered Projected Luenberger (Measurement) Update:
while V (zˆΠ(t)) ≥ V (zˆΠ(t− 1)) do
reset m := 0, zˆ(0)(t) = zˆΠ(t) = Π(zˆ(t));
Vtemp := V (zˆΠ(t));
while Vtemp ≥ V (zˆΠ(t)) do
zˆ(m+1)(t) := zˆ(m)(t) + L
(
Y (t)−Qzˆ(m)(t));
Vtemp := V (Π
(
zˆ(m+1)(t)
)
);
m := m+ 1;
end while
zˆ(t) := zˆ(m)(t);
end while
To make the connection with the standard Luenberger observer clearer, assume that only one
Luenberger/projection update is required per time update. In this case, the ETPL observer can
be written as:
zˆ(t) = AzˆΠ(t− 1) +Bu(t− 1)
+ L′ (Y (t− 1)−QzˆΠ(t− 1))
zˆΠ(t) = Π(zˆ(t))
which has the form of a standard Luenberger observer with gain L′ = A L along with the
projection Π step.
Remark V.1. It follows from Remark IV.9 that we can replace the inner loop in Algorithm 2
with one update step if we fix the Luenberger gain L to be L = Q+.
B. Convergence of the ETPL Observer
In this subsection we discuss the convergence and performance of the ETPL observer. The
main result of this subsection is stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem V.2. (Convergence of the ETPL observer) Let the linear control system defined by
(II.1) and (II.2) be 2s-observable system with 2s-restricted eigenvalue δ2s. If the following
condition holds:
δ2s >
4
9
λmax{QTQ}
then the dynamical system defined by the ETPL observer is a solution to Problem II.4 whenever
L = QTΣ for any positive definite weighting matrix Σ satisfying λmax{Σ} < λ−1max{QTQ}.
The proof of Theorem V.2 is based on the Lyapunov candidate function:
W (t) = ‖z(t)− zˆ(t)‖2 = ‖e(t)‖2 ,
and follows the exact same argument used in the proof of Theorem IV.3 with the exception
of the need to account for an increase in V caused by the time update step. Such increase is
compensated by applying the Luenberger update loop multiple times. This increase is described
in the next result.
C. Effect of Time Update
Proposition V.3. Consider the linear control system defined by (II.1) and (II.2). The following
inequality holds:
W (zˆ(t)) ≤ ∥∥A∥∥
2
W (zˆ(t− 1)),
whenever zˆ(t) ∈ Rn × Rpτ and zˆ(t− 1) ∈ Rn × Rpτ are related by:
zˆ(t) = Azˆ(t− 1) +Bu(t− 1).
Proof: The Lyapunov candidate function W (zˆ(t)) after applying the time update step, can
be written as follows:
W (zˆ(t)) = ‖z∗(t)− zˆ(t)‖2 =
∥∥Az∗(t− 1) +Bu(t− 1)− Azˆ(t− 1)−Bu(t− 1)∥∥
2
=
∥∥A(z∗(t− 1)− zˆ(t− 1))∥∥
2
≤ ∥∥A∥∥
2
W (zˆ(t− 1)).
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Proof of Theorem V.2: First, we note that the Luenberger update loop in Algorithm 2 is
identical to the outer loop of Algorithm 1 with the loop guard V
(
zˆ
(k)
Π
)
< 0 (Line 2 in Algorithm
1) replaced with V (zˆΠ(t)) < V (zˆΠ(t− 1)). Hence, it follows from Theorem IV.3 that “Event-
Triggered Luenberger Update” loop terminates. From the termination of the Luenberger update
loop, we conclude that the increase caused by the time update (Proposition V.3) can always be
compensated. Accordingly, using the same argument that was used in the proof of Theorem IV.3,
we conclude that limt→∞W (zˆΠ(t)) = 0 and hence the estimate converges to the desired value
z∗.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Multiple Attacking Sequences
In this example we consider an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) under different types of
sensor attacks. We assume that the UGV moves along straight lines and completely stops before
rotating. Under these assumptions, we can describe the dynamics of the UGV by:
x˙
v˙
 =
0 1
0 −B
M
x
v
+
 0
1
M
F,
 θ˙
ω˙
 =
0 1
0 −Br
J
θ
ω
+
0
1
J
T,
where x, v, θ, ω are the states of the UGV corresponding to position, linear velocity, angular
position and angular velocity, respectively. The parameters M,J,B,Br denote the mechanical
mass, inertia, translational friction coefficient and the rotational friction coefficient. The inputs
to the UGV are the force F and the torque T . The UGV is equipped with a GPS sensor which
measures the UGV position, two motor encoders which measure the translational velocity and an
inertial measurement unit which measures both rotational velocity and rotational position. We as-
sume that encoders perform the necessary processing to directly provide a velocity measurement
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and hence the resulting output equation can be written as:
y =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


x
v
θ
ω
+

ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψ4
ψ5

,
where ψi is the measurement noise of the ithe sensor which is assumed to be gaussian with zero
norm and finite covariance.
By applying Proposition III.4 for different values of s, we conclude that the UGV can be
resilient only to one attack on any of the two encoders. Attacking any other sensor precludes
the system from being 2s-sparse observable.
Figure 2 shows the performance of the proposed algorithms under different attacks on the
UGV motor encoders. The attacker alternates between corrupting the left and the right encoder
measurements as shown in Figure 2(d) and Figure 2(c). Three different types of attacks are
considered. First, the attacker corrupts the sensor signal with random noise. The next attack
consists of a step function followed by a ramp. Finally a replay-attack is mounted by replaying
the previously measured UGV velocity.
The UGV vehicle goal is to move 5m along a straight line, stop and perform a 90o rotation
and repeat this pattern 3 times until it traces a square and returns to its original position and
orientation. In Figures 2(a) and 2(b) we show the result of using the ETPG algorithm and the
ETPL observer to reconstruct the state under sensor attacks. The reconstructed state is used by
a linear feedback tracking controller forcing the UGV to track the desired square trajectory.
The reconstructed position and velocity are shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). These figures
show that both algorithms are able to successfully reconstruct the state and hence the UGV
is able to reach its goal despite the attacks. Moreover, we observe that the ETPL observer is
less sensitive to noise compared to the ETPG. This follows from the fact the ETPL observer
“averages out” the noise by using all the available sensor data as it becomes available.
Recall that the attack model in Section II requires the set of attacked sensors to remain constant
over time. However, Figure 2 shows the proposed algorithms correctly constructing the state even
though this assumption is violated. This is due to the fact that the period during which only
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one sensor is attacked is sufficiently long compared with the time it takes for the algorithms to
converge.
B. Computational Performance
We compare the efficiency of the proposed ETPG and ETPL algorithms against the L1/Lr
decoder introduced in [10]. To perform this comparison, we randomly generated 100 systems
with n = 20 and p = 25 and simulated them against an increasing number of attacked sensors
ranging from 0 to 12. For each test case we generated a random support set for the attack vector,
random attack signal and random initial conditions. Averaged results for the different numbers
of attacked sensors are shown in Figure 3. Although we claim no statistical significance, the
results in Figure 3 are characteristic of the many simulations performed by the authors. The
L1/Lr decoder is implemented using CVX while the ETPG and ETPL algorithms are direct
implementations of Algorithms 1 and 2 in Matlab. The tests were performed on a desktop
equipped with an Intel Core i7 processor operating at 3.4 GHz and 8 GBytes of memory.
Note that the ETPL observer, as required by any solution to Problem II.4, is an asymptotic
observer, i.e., the reconstructed state converges to the true state asymptotically. This should be
contrasted with the ETPG algorithm where a single execution of Algorithm 1 is sufficient to
construct an estimate which is sufficiently close1 to the system state. Hence, to compare the
ETPG and ETPL algorithms we define the execution time as the time needed by Algorithms 1
and 2 to terminate and the convergence time as the time needed by each algorithm from the start
of the execution until the estimate becomes -close to the system state (with  is set to  = 10−6
in this example). Note that the execution time affects the choice of the sampling period when
the algorithm is deployed while the convergence time reflects the performance of each of the
algorithms.
In Figure 3(a) we can appreciate how both the ETPG and the ETPL algorithms outperform
the L1/Lr decoder by an order of magnitude in execution time. We also observe that the ETPG
algorithm requires more execution time compared to the ETPL observer. This follows from the
existence of the outer-loop in the ETPG algorithm which requires the Lyapunov function to
1Although the outer loop of Algorithm 1 requires V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
≤ 0 for termination, our implementation used instead
V
(
zˆ
(k−1)
Π
)
≤  with  = 10−6.
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(a) Reconstructed position versus ground truth.
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(b) Reconstructed velocity versus ground truth.
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(c) Reconstructed attack on left encoder versus ground truth.
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(d) Reconstructed attack on right encoder versus ground truth.
Fig. 2. Performance of the UGV controller in the cases where no attack takes place versus the case where the attack signal is
applied to the UGV encoders. The objective is to move 5 m, stop and perform a 90o rotation and repeat this pattern to follow
a square path. The controller uses ETPG algorithm and ETPL Observer to reconstruct the UGV states. In both cases we show
the linear position (top), linear velocity (middle), and the reconstruction of the attack signal (bottom).
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Fig. 3. Timing analysis of the L1/L2 decoder versus the ETPG and ETPL algorithms for different numbers of attacked sensors.
Subfigure (a) shows the time required to execute each of the three algorithms. Subfigure (b) shows the time required for the
estimate, computed by each of the algorithms, to become -close to the system state for  = 10−6.
reach zero before termination. In Figure 3(b) we show the convergence time for each of the
three algorithms. It follows from the nature of the L1/Lr decoder and the ETPG algorithm that
the execution time and the convergence time are both equal. This is not the case for the ETPL
observer which requires a longer convergence time compared to the ETPG algorithm. These two
figures illustrate the tradeoff between execution timing and performance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we considered the problem of designing computationally efficient algorithms for
state reconstruction under sparse adversarial attacks/noise. We characterized the solvability of
this problem by using the notion of sparse observability and proposed two algorithms for state
reconstruction. To improve the timing performance of the proposed algorithms, we adopted an
event-triggered approach that determines on-line how many gradient steps should be executed
per projection on the set of constraints. These algorithms can be further improved along multiple
directions such as dynamically adjusting the step size or using more refined gradient algorithms,
such as conjugated gradient.
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